environmental authorities, within the more general realm of environmental administration and environmental governance. 5 One of the aspects that are regulated by environmental governance and administration, is infrastructural development, which in most instances, may have a detrimental effect on the environment.
Infrastructural development activities are important for, inter alia, economic progress and the improvement of socio-economic conditions, and depend to a large extent on administrative decision-making by environmental authorities. 6 It is however noteworthy that development is sometimes hampered by inefficient and delayed decision-making processes by environmental authorities, which may adversely affect the developer.
7
It is argued in this article that there exists a close relationship between administrative implementation and decision-making, and a right to an environment that is not harmful to peoples' health or well-being.
For a balance to be created between the rights of the developer and the duties on environmental authorities to realise the content and objectives of constitutional and environmental legislation, it is accordingly necessary to investigate the issue of administrative justice in the context of environmental administration and governance. aggrieved developer whose right to administrative justice has been infringed. The importance and relevance of administrative justice in the context of environmental governance are illustrated by reflecting on two recent judgments that, although not specifically dealing with administrative justice in the context of environmental administration, may provide some guidance as to the future application of administrative justice in the realm of environmental governance and administration. In discussing these judgments, specific emphasis is placed on the right to administrative justice, and the possible effect of the judicial interpretation of administrative justice on other rights of the developer that correlate with the section 33 constitutional right. 9 Section 24 reflects characteristics of both a classical fundamental human right and a socio-economic right.
Section 24 of the 1996 Constitution and administrative implementation
Section 24 of the 1996 Constitution states that:
Everyone has the right-(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and (b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that-(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation;
(ii) promote conservation; and (iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and social development. 10 The first generational character of the right is embodied in section 24(a), whilst the socio-economic character of the right is found in section 24(b).
11
9 These rights include the right to dispute settlement, the right to access to information, and the right to a wide legal standing. See par 4 below for a detailed discussion. 
12
The realisation of section 24 may be regarded as a regulatory function belonging to government.
13 Government in this context includes, inter alia: national, provincial and local spheres; 14 the various line functionaries in each sphere; 15 and government officials functioning in these spheres and line functions. It may furthermore be deduced that there is a relationship between the enforcement of the environmental right and administrative implementation. Implementation in this context is a very broad term which arguably includes the enforcement of legislation, making of subsidiary rules, and formulation of policy. 16 Various actors are involved with the implementation of environmental law. These include public authorities, employees of public authorities and government departments, and the public service or administration.
17
… the public service is under a constitutional duty loyally to execute 'the lawful policies of the government of the day', and it does this chiefly by implementing legislation.
More pertinent in this regard however is that: 12 S 8 of the 1996 Constitution states that a "…provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right". Hence, it is argued in addition, that s 24 also has a horisontal operation which makes it applicable between individuals themselves and not only between the state and individuals. See also Glazewski Environmental Law 88-89. 13 For a detailed discussion on the administration, implementation and enforcement of environmental law in SA, see Water is a natural resources as contemplated in section 24(b)(iii) of the 1996 Constitution. Hence, there is an obligation on government to 'secure governance. It is argued further that implementation may be done by way of 'reasonable legislative and other measures' contemplated in section 24(b) of the 1996 Constitution. In this instance, 'reasonable legislative and other measures' may include the provisions of the NWA.
The relationship between section 24 and administrative implementation is furthermore evident from the argument that the most obvious feature of potential environmental impacts and pollution problems is that they affect both public health and resources, which are public goods. 20 The risk of pollution often arises from otherwise legitimate activities within society, such as the accommodation of waste in the environment in a manner which may impact on health and/or the integrity of resources. The implication is that the control of potential impacts on humans and the environment is typically a regulatory function, since society must be protected from pollution by government action.
21
It is furthermore argued that there exists a close link between environmental governance and environmental administration and implementation. Environmental governance is a relatively novel term in South African law. It can be defined as "…the Administrative implementation is therefore necessary to comprehensively and adequately give effect to, and realise the aims of, section 24 through the execution of necessary government actions. This right is provided for by section 33 of the 1996 Constitution which states that:
(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.
(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the right to be given written reasons.
(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and must -(a) provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal;
(b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsections (1) and (2); and (c) promote an efficient administration. 41 In sharp contrast with the past regime of parliamentary sovereignty, it is argued that individuals have certain rights, privileges and liberties in the context of an administrative relationship. These rights are enumerated in, inter alia, section 33 of the 1996 Constitution. Where the public administration consequently acts in an unlawful manner and contrary to public interest when administering its functions, the state may be held liable in terms of section 33 and the provisions of the PAJA.
42
There is a close relationship between administrative justice and the term "administrative action". The meaning of "administrative action" in section 33(1), is demarcated to include actions of an administrative nature which are taken by bodies The provisions on the right to be given written reasons are arguably meant to promote a more transparent, public-participatory, democratic and efficient administration.
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The provisions on administrative justice should be read together with the provisions of section 195(1) and section 195(2) of the 1996 Constitution that establish basic values and principles according to which the public administration must be executed. 53 It is stated in this regard that the public administration must be governed by the general democratic values and principles enshrined in the 1996 Constitution.
Moreover, a number of specific principles are provided for, which advocate that: a high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and maintained; efficient economic and effective use of resources must be promoted; public administration must be development-oriented; services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias; people's needs must be responded to, and the public must be encouraged to participate in policy-making; public administration must be accountable; transparency must be fostered by providing the public with timely, accessible and accurate information; good human-resource management and careerdevelopment practices to maximise human potential, must be cultivated; and public administration must be broadly representative of the South African people, with employment and personnel management practices based on ability, objectivity, fairness, and the need to redress the imbalances of the past to achieve broad representation. 54 It is explicitly stated that these principles apply to all organs of state as well as state administration in every sphere of government.
55
It is clear from the above that an individual, who seeks for example authorisation for a development activity that may adversely affect the environment, has certain rights based merely on the provisions of section 33. Broadly speaking, these rights fall within the ambit of the more generally-termed right to administrative justice which should be read together with section 195 of the 1996 Constitution. As separate components of this general right, the developer in particular has the right to written reasons, and administrative action that should be based on the principles of natural justice which include reasonableness and fairness. Because of these rights, it is thus clear that the developer does not stand wholly at the mercy of the public for an infringement of any of these rights, and may in addition be obliged to rectify any infringement.
The right to dispute settlement
The right to just administrative action is reinforced and extended by the right to have disputes settled by a court or another independent forum.
56
It is trite that this right cannot be invoked where a developer applies for an environmental authorisation in terms of environmental legislation. For the protection of section 34 to become operative and applicable, it is necessary that a dispute should exist. A developer who is accordingly of the opinion that his or her authorisation application is being unreasonably delayed or denied unlawfully, can approach a court of law or independent tribunal or forum, to have the legal dispute that arose because of the delay or denial, adjudicated.
Section 34 of the 1996
Constitution states that:
Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum. 57 The right to have a dispute settled has even greater application possibilities, which may extend the rights of any aggrieved developer. This is because this right further includes: a right of access to a court or independent forum; the requirement that courts and forums should be independent and impartial; and the requirement that the dispute be decided in a fair and public hearing. 
The right of access to information
The right of access to information which is currently regulated by the Promotion of The NEMA however significantly extends the right to access to information provided in the PATIA to environmental matters. Section 2(4)(k) of the NEMA specifically … every person is entitled to have access to information held by the State and organs of state which relates to the implementation of this Act and any other law affecting the environment, and to the state of the environment and actual and future threats to the environment, including any emissions to water, air or soil and the production, handling, transportation, treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous waste and substances.
72
It can be deduced from the above that, in addition to the right to administrative justice and access to courts, any aggrieved developer who suffers at the hands of an 67 See the example of water use license under ch 4 of the National Water Act 36 of 1998 discussed in par 2 above. See also for a more general discussion Du Plessis 1998 SAJELP 115-139. 68 S 9 of the PATIA. 69 "Public safety or environmental risk" is defined in s 1 as: "…harm or risk to the environment or the public (including individuals in their workplace) associated with-(a) a product or service which is available to the public; (b) a substance released into the environment, including, but not limited to, the workplace; (c) a substance intended for human or animal consumption; (d) a means of public transport; or (e) an installation or manufacturing process or substance which is used in that installation or process. 70 Glazewski Environmental Law 112. 71 It is significant that access to information is provided for in s 2 of the NEMA. This section describes the national environmental management principles, which are applicable throughout SA to the actions of all organs of state. The NEMA therefore recognises the importance of access to information for the successful functioning of, not only environmental management and governance, but also for the achievement of the objectives of the act as a whole.
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inefficient environmental administration, may also rely on his or her right to access to information. Secondly, it may even be argued that apart from liberating public interest litigation, section 32(1)(e) extends the locus standi provisions, by providing that individuals or a group may currently act not only in their own interests, but also in the interest of the environment.
76
Adhering to its constitutional obligation contained in section 33(3) of the 1996 Constitution, the legislator enacted the PAJA which came into operation on 30
November 2000.
As far as 'having an interest in the relief sought' is concerned, it is significant that the environment is equated in terms of legal standing with individuals and groups. This may ultimately broaden the rights of developers and enhance environmental protection when the right to just administrative action is infringed.
5
The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act
77 The rationale of the PAJA is to place the primary right to administrative justice and the courts' powers of judicial review on statutory footing. right to administrative justice, the judiciary will however still heed constitutional and common law principles that give meaning to this right. 80 The constitutionally entrenched right to just administrative action will therefore still continue to function alongside the provisions of the PAJA.
81
The PAJA contains a number of provisions that may be relevant for an aggrieved developer who seeks recourse when his or her right to administrative justice has been infringed by an environmental authority during environmental administration and governance procedures. 
Administrative action defined
Some of these provisions are discussed hereafter.
Administrative action is not defined in the 1996 Constitution. 83 There are however a number of judgments that endeavoured to ascertain the meaning of administrative action in section 33 (1) The main aim of the PAJA is to give effect to the provisions contemplated in s 33 of the 1996 Constitution which embodies the right to just administrative action. By defining the rules and principles of administrative procedure, the PAJA furthermore aims to promote an efficient administration and good governance and to establish a culture of accountability, openness and transparency in the public administration. This is in accordance with the provisions of the 1996 Constitution. See also Burns Administrative Law 10. 82 Amongst other things, the PAJA provides a more detailed exposition of the constitutional right to administrative justice, specific procedures that are applicable to the public administration, the grounds for judicial review, procedures for those who wish to challenge administrative action and procedures for the request of written reasons. It can be deduced that the definition of administrative action and decision, will include those decisions made and administrative actions performed within the empowering provisions of environmental legislation, such as the ECA and the NWA.
The developer has certain rights which include both existing rights and rights that she may have if she is for example granted a water use licence under the NWA. Where the developer experiences mala fides or prejudice from the relevant environmental authority during the decision-making process, she will also be entitled to approach a court of law to enforce his or her right to administrative justice.
Judicial control through review
Hoexter and Lyster 103 indicate that South African courts have always played, and will continue to play, a crucial role in overseeing the activities of the administration. The judiciary supervises the administration by way of judicial review which is provided for by, inter alia, section 33 of the 1996 Constitution, the PAJA, 104 and special statutory review.
105
… power to scrutinise administrative decisions and, where appropriate, to set them aside or correct them.
Judicial review essentially describes the judiciary's-
106
Judicial review in South Africa is firmly based on constitutional provisions, which include legality and the duty to protect constitutional rights.
107
… any person may institute proceedings in a court or a tribunal for the judicial review of an administrative action.
Of practical relevance for any developer will be the provisions of section 6 of the PAJA. Section 6(1) provides that- These provisions may arguably enhance the remedies at the disposal of any developer who feels that his or her development application has been, inter alia, unlawfully and unreasonably dealt with.
It is also for these reasons, and other reasons discussed below, that judicial precedent may be especially important for aggrieved developers who want to assert their right to, inter alia, administrative justice. Based on the discussion in paragraph 6 below, it is argued that judicial review of administrative action, may be a useful remedy in the hands of developers who are being adversely affected by maladministration.
6
An analysis of recent case law
The reliance on jurisprudence for the development of administrative justice should not be underestimated since,
110
Two recent judgments in the South Eastern Cape Local Division may provide some guidance as to the application of administrative justice in the context of administrative functions performed in terms of matters relating to the environment. These judgments do not specifically relate to administrative justice in terms of environmental administration and environmental governance. The judgments furthermore do not specifically address the right to dispute settlement, the right to access to information, and the right to a wide legal standing. These judgments rather focus on the right to administrative justice. However, as has been argued above, the rights to access to 108 S 6 of the PAJA should be read together with s 7 of the act that sets out the procedure of judicial review. 109 S 6(2)-6(3).
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information, dispute settlement, and a wide legal standing, stand in close correlation with the right to administrative justice.
111
Based on the merit of the applicability of administrative justice to environmental administration and governance, these judgments may go a long way to further enhance the concept of administrative justice from a judicial point of view.
Hence, it is argued, that the importance the court places on the right to administrative justice, may be an indication that other constitutional rights closely connected to the section 33 right, may in future be regarded in an equally important light whenever these rights are invoked to protect against maladministration.
112
Mahambehlala v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape and Another
The court's approach to maladministration and insufficiency in the public administration domain may be proof that administrative injustice within the ranks of environmental authorities, as was the case in these judgments, will not be tolerated. This may significantly advance the case of any aggrieved developer who's right to administrative justice and accompanying rights have been infringed.
In the recent case of Mahambehlala v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape and
Another,
113
In terms of section 2(a) of the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992, the Director General:
Welfare of the Eastern Cape Provincial Government, is empowered to make social grants to disabled persons who qualify for such grants under the provisions of the act.
Certain regulations were published in 1998 to provide for the manner in which applications for grants were to be made, the approval or refusal of any application, as well as the date of accrual of any approved grant.
the applicant instituted legal proceedings against the MEC for Welfare in the Eastern Cape, by contending, inter alia, that her right to just administrative action was infringed in terms of section 33 of the 1996 Constitution. 
Facts of the case
Argument of the court
The applicant contended that, by delaying the approval of her application for a social grant, the respondent infringed her fundamental right enshrined in section 33(1) of the 1996 Constitution that espouses the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.
116
…common sense tells one that in a case such as this where no unduly intricate investigations have to be made, a period of three months would normally be more than sufficient to take an administrative decision. In any event, if it was not, one would certainly have expected the respondent to detail why such a period would not be reasonable.
The argument in this regard is founded upon the contention that a period of three months would have been a "more than reasonable time" for the second respondent to have applied his mind to the matter and reached a decision.
In its assessment of the matter before it, the court stated that: 117 115 For the purpose of this article, only the issue relating to just administrative action is discussed. 116 At 351F. 117 At 351I.
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It also added that when the applicant instituted proceedings against the respondent, it took virtually no time at all for her application to be processed.
118
… administrative sloth and inefficiency which currently bedevils the Department of Welfare of the Eastern Cape.
This led the court to believe that it was the institution of the proceedings that led to the expeditious processing of her application and not the-
119
… is today but a single department in the Eastern Cape responsible for the administration of the applicant's application.
With this statement the court rejected contentions by the respondent that lack of resources and infrastructure led to the unreasonable delay, and further reaffirmed that in the absence of adequate reasons given by the respondent to justify the delay, no conclusion could be reached that the delay was indeed reasonable.
The respondents also contended that the amalgamation of a number of different social security systems from the previous administration led to the delay in the application being processed. The court however held that the respondents failed to explain how the amalgamation resulted in the delay and furthermore stated that there- which is five months before it was finally approved on 9 November 2000.
121
Having found that the delay in approving the grant was indeed unreasonable, the court proceeded to decide whether the right of the applicant to just administrative action has been infringed. Cape.
122
…the essence of the applicant's case in the present matter is that the respondents have failed to comply with their statutory duty, and not that they have failed to follow or adopt procedures which are ''right and just and fair''. The only other section which may find application in the present matter is s 24(a). This section entitles every person to lawful administrative action where any of his or her rights or interests are affected or threatened. ''Administrative action'' should in my view not be limited to administrative acts or decisions but should also include the failure by a body exercising public power to act where it has a duty to act. ''Lawful administrative action'' is wide enough to also include an omission to take administrative action where such a duty is imposed. The present court concurred with the above view and stated that failure to take administrative action where there is a duty to take such action, would not constitute lawful administrative action, and would consequently infringe on the right contained in section 24 of the Interim Constitution.
By commenting on section 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of South
124
The court consequently found that section 24 of the Interim Constitution and section 33(1) of the 1996 Constitution contain similar terms. Seen in this context, the court construed that a failure to take administrative action where such a duty exists, constitutes an equal infringement of the right to just administrative action as in those instances where an application is unreasonably refused. 125 With reference to the failure to take the decision within a reasonable time, the court came to the conclusion that the applicant's right to just administrative action had been unlawfully and unreasonably infringed.
126
The court in the final instance proceeded to assess whether the applicant would be entitled to appropriate relief due to the infringement of a fundamental right, as set out In a lengthy argument, the court reiterated the fact that the current constitutional provisions effectively subsumed the common- fact that his right to just administrative action, as envisaged in section 33 of the 1996 Constitution, has been infringed.
Facts of the case
On 10 March 1998 the applicant properly applied for a social grant in terms of the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992 and the accompanying regulations. The applicant claimed relief including: that the second respondent, or the appropriate official in his department, be ordered to consider and decide upon the applicant's application for a social grant; that in the event of the second respondent approving the applicant's application for a social grant, the first respondent be ordered to commence payment thereof with effect from 10 March 1998, within 15 days after the date of the order, and to continue such payments on a monthly basis thereafter for as long as the applicant qualifies for such payments in terms of the relevant laws; and to pay interest on arrears. The applicant furthermore claimed that in the event of the DirectorGeneral refusing the applicant's approval for a social grant, the second respondent is ordered to provide reasons for the decision taken, and that the second respondent pays the costs of this application. Following agreement by the parties on some of the aforementioned issues, a remaining matter had to be addressed by the court, namely the contention by the applicant that his right to just administrative action has been infringed in terms of section 33 of the 1996 Constitution.
As in the case of Mahambehlala, the court found in this instance that the period of 32 months it took for a decision to be made by the respondent was unreasonable. A reasonable period for a decision on an application for a social grant to be taken would rather be three months. Hence, the failure to take a decision consequently amounted to The court further emphasised that these two cases are not isolated incidents of administrative inefficiency but that they "… rather appear to be the tip of the iceberg". 138 In a strongly-worded dictum the court declares that:
140
As with the Mahambehlala case, the court, in casu, ordered "constitutional relief" to be afforded which essentially aims to place the applicant in the same position in which he would have been had his fundamental right to lawful and reasonable administrative action not been infringed. 
Some comments
A number of aspects came to the fore in the above judgments. In the first instance, it is clear that the court will assess the content of the right to just administrative action with reference to all the surrounding circumstances involved in the matter before it. It will take into account, inter alia, the urgency of the matter, historical perspectives, Secondly, it is apparent that the court will not attribute much weight to contentions that administrative practices are inefficient due to lack of resources and infrastructure, or problems inherited from the pre-1994 government. It is evident that the protection of the fundamental rights of individuals is of far greater importance to the court.
These fundamental rights may not only include the right to just administrative action, but also the right to dispute settlement, the right to access to information, and the right to a wide legal standing.
142
Thirdly, the court emphasises the present judicial attitude towards an inefficient state administration.
Based on the emphasis of the importance to uphold the right to administrative justice in these judgments, it is accordingly proposed that the judiciary may in future attribute the same credence to other fundamental rights that aim to protect the developer from maladministration by the state.
143
It is proposed that these judgments may be of great assistance to affected individuals whose rights have been infringed in the realm of administrative actions performed by environmental governance bodies. Where a developer, for example, apply for an authorisation in terms of the provisions of the ECA or the NWA, it may be expected that courts will arguably find in favour of the developer where the application is unreasonably delayed, or where there are mala fides, or prejudice on the part of the environmental authority. This may in addition contribute to the remedies that a developer has where he or she suffers, for example, financial loss because of
In no unclear terms the court states that it will not tolerate inefficient administration by public officials in those instances where the fundamental rights of individuals may be infringed by the attitude and conduct, or non-conduct, of such officials. This may particularly contribute to the establishment of judicial precedents that may make it increasingly difficult for the state administration to hide behind excuses that are intolerable in a modern constitutional dispensation where the protection of fundamental human rights should be paramount. 89/204 infrastructural development that can not proceed before the relevant environmental authorisations have been granted. If these judgments are an indication of future judicial developments with regard to the issue of unjust administrative action, it may be expected that the rights of developers will be more adequately protected when having to deal with environmental governance bodies. This may additionally imply that by executing environmental governance that is firmly based on the principles of just administrative action, the state will adhere to its constitutional obligation as enumerated in, inter alia, sections 24 and 33 of the 1996 Constitution.
Conclusion
While developers are currently given the mandate and legislative support to conduct It is proposed that developers can, and henceforth should, rely on constitutional and legislative provisions and judicial precedents, that oblige administrative organs to conduct administrative decision-making in a reasonable and just way. 
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